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CURRICULAR REFORM FOR LAW SCHOOL
NEEDS OF THE FUTURE*
CHARLES

D.

KELSO**

If we consider a law school to be a gathering of faculty members
and students-a community of scholars, if you please-and attend only
to their needs (giving "needs" its usual connotation of something that is
badly wanted), we would have some very dramatic curricular reforms. In
fact, we could neglect to construct what is commonly called a curriculum,
for we would permit each professor to teach what he wanted to teach and
we would encourage each student to study what he wanted to study. This
might result in some teachers with many students, some teachers without
students, some students without teachers, and one hell of an interesting
place.
Educational conservatives may object that in Kelso wonderland some
students might take courses from only a few members of the faculty-or
might take the same course from a number of different teachers. At first
blush this seems a bit shocking. But I recall that I have taken Jurisprudence four times-from different instructors-and learned something
quite different each time. At Chicago, I took Constitutional Law three
times. Each time it was different. Each time it was a great course. And I
took Comparative Law twice from Professor Rheinstein. Both courses
were wonderful. It just so happened that he was interested in something
else the second time around.
I could push this line of reasoning to an extreme by postulating
a law school whose Dean hired men interested only in criminal law.
This Criminal Law School might collapse my straw man, but buried
in the heap would be a deep conviction that great teachers (and
teachers who may perhaps be less gifted in the classroom, but who
nevertheless are teaching what they love), and students who are studying
what they want to study, are far more important than making sure that
each student is exposed to a carefully balanced set of courses listed in a
finely structured bulletin.
Now let me re-interpret the title of this Round Table, and assume
that by "Law School Needs of the Future," we are referring to something
more than the desires of those involved in the institution. We are considering the needs of society for the product of our work: our ideas and
our trained graduates who will have ideas. How can we best reform our
curriculum or decide whether reform is needed, in order not simply to
have intellectual fun, but rather to carry out serious responsibilities.
* Delivered at the 1966 AALS Curriculum Committee Round Table, Washington, D.C.
** Associate Dean, University of Miami School of Law.
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Usually if we think of curricular reform, we think of adding a course
here or there, or subtracting a course, or transferring certain topics from
one course to another. Occasionally, we are aware that the curriculum
changes interstitially, as new law is made, new books are published, and
new teachers are hired.
However, if we are to deal with reform and not merely gradual
change, my first suggestion is that we should reformulate our basic
perspective-indeed, we must reconstruct even the vocabulary with which
we customarily think about reform. Analyzing an educational program
into curriculum, courses, teaching methods and teaching materials is one
of the most troublesome obstacles in the path of reform. These distinctions
are not realistic and impede creative thinking when we consider, as we
must, what goes on in the process of teaching and learning.
Men learn by responding to a sequence of stimuli, and by being
reinforced, at least occasionally, for some of those responses. The sequence of stimuli and the timing and nature of reinforcement are the
critical variables. Thus, Contracts under Professor X is not the same
course as Contracts under Professor Y-even if both X and Y use the
same casebook. If we are serious about reform, we must find out much
more about what is really going on in our classrooms. Otherwise, for
example, we might eliminate Agency as a first year course because we
think it is more logically absorbed by Business Organizations-only to
eliminate from our first year the teacher who best taught the students
how to read cases with understanding.
The use of recording equipment in classes may help provide classroom data not now available for more enlightened reform of the educational program of a law school. Once the old distinctions are replaced
with a modern conception of the learning process, many other useful
devices for reform are suggested, and many questions are posed including some that pertain to that hallowed ground-the first year program.
Talk of curricular reform these days usually centers on the advanced
years. Elsewhere I have contributed a few suggestions on that topic. The
dialogue currently includes such concepts as realism, new fields of law,
new roles for lawyers, new organizations of lawyers, para-legal training,
and interdisciplinary teaching coupled with empirical research and modern
technology. These matters have already been dealt with this evening, so I
shall confine the balance of my remarks to reform of the first year
educational program.
The perspective I have suggested as vital-a perspective which is
based upon modern theories of learning and teaching produces questions
-as I have said. Specifically, I am not satisfied that I know the answers
to questions such as these:
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1. If we mixed problem method teaching with case method teaching
during the first year, would the students have an enhanced appetite for the case method in at least some of their advanced
courses?
2. If we mixed beginning students with advanced students in at
least one course, what kind of intellectual transfusions would
take place? Many schools use a carousel for their second and
third years. I know of one school which uses a complete merry-goround for all students-with no visible evil effects. If the students
run into unknown concepts, they get out hornbooks or Am. Jur.
and do some hasty reading. Is that bad?
3. And, more seriously, by what criteria do our first year courses
justify their continued required existence: frequency of application; social significance; doctrinal fundamentality?
Fundamental doctrine is the answer that seems to be most comfortable. However, I wonder how fundamental is our common law learning
of offer, acceptance and consideration if much of it, for all practical
purposes, can be wiped out by a few provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, or if businessmen are seldom concerned with it. How
fundamental is negligence, if a compensation statute replaces it? How
many fee tails have you created lately?
Of course, some knowledge of procedure is required to read a case
with full understanding. But I wonder whether a semester with the
intricacies of pleading and practice gives those matters a prominence
which later results in satisfaction with decisions based on such doctrine
rather than on the human equities of the situation.
What alternatives do I have to offer-since most contracts and torts
teachers are tenured?
One approach would be to assume that it is more important, initially,
to instill students with a humanist approach to law and acquaint them with
the law's all pervasive character. Thus, I think one could seriously consider placing our courses on civil rights, urban problems, and the like, in
the first year, along with a general introductory course on case-reading,
legal remedies, and legal system. For pervasiveness, as well as a balanced
view on common law and legislation, how about taxation or commercial
law in the first year?
When it came time to take senior courses, students so taught would
tell their torts and contracts teachers, "We can read cases-let's see you
teach us something that's really significant about these fields of law."
With less tongue in cheek, I offer my second suggestion: Let the
present group of first year teachers take on the job of showing how law
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is a humanist and pervasive activity. What might come of this? What
changes would be in store?
Here are my bricks-tentative bricks because the mortar is still
rather wet:
First: At least the following things should be learned by law students
in the first year because they will be useful in all other courses and in
their professional careers, no matter whether they remain generalists or
become specialists:
a. Relationships between law and values.
b. The creation and functioning of a legal institution-that is, a
group of jobs or tasks around which are organized a group of men
responsible for the doing of those jobs.
c. The devices by which the common law and the interpretation of
legislation, including the constitution, are changed gradually over
a period of time, and the kinds of situations and reasons that are
associated with such change.
d. Ways of dealing with disputes.
e. How to read cases and statutes for and with understanding.
f. How to engage in legal research.
Second: I don't think it makes much difference in which of the
traditional first-year courses these things are done-or whether there is
some overlapping or duplicating. Indeed, each one could be taught in
every first year course. Third: I do have some hunches as to where they
are most likely to be best done, and I shall pass along these hunches as
my most specific recommendations for reform of our first year educational
program.
A. Torts is the course best suited for reform that would help freshmen
law students relate law and values. Sometimes we require a finding of
fault in order to shift the financial burden of an injury from one person to
another. Sometimes we do not. Why? Sometimes we shift the burden of
compensating for injury to a causative actor or sometimes to one who is
remote in a causal chain. Why? Some injuries or disappointments are
spread over the entire society, as when we have severe floods or too little
crops-or too many. Why those risks and not others?
The values are not all "moral values." We may have considerations
here of efficiency in law administration versus accurate justice-as when
we use tables in Workmen's Compensation. Why this? This "Why" is
particularly timely because we know that compensation for damage
caused by automobiles is on the verge of dramatically different approaches as well may be compensation for product injuries.
When the field of torts is approached from the point of view of values
it merges gently into welfare and subsidy law. We now shift the burden of
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certain non-fault injuries to the public through Medicare. Social Security
includes a kind of public life insurance program. Is this so far off from the
guaranteed annual income-or the negative income tax?
Torts-as I have been talking about it-no longer sounds too much
like torts. But as I have been saying, course labels, like the word "curriculum," are stultifying. Perhaps we need a new name here, such as
Injury Compensation and Prevention.
B. In my opinion, Contracts is the course best suited for students to gain
a preliminary understanding of legal institutions. Every contract creates
a miniature legal institution. The emphasis, realistically, is not on offer,
acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent, so much as it is on interpretation and drafting and the forces which influence men's conduct in
relation to the institution created by the contract.
Contracts seem ready-made for problem method treatment, at least
after the cases are dealt with. Counselling functions should be emphasized.
What caused the difficulty? What steps other than the law suit might have
been taken? Contracts also provides a good stepping stone into agency
problems and some introduction to the limitations imposed on freedom
of contract, not only by doctrines of illegality, but also by governmental
regulation. Here again law and values blend and merge.
C. Property is the course best suited for a realistic look at legal history.
Not a history which ends with the statute of uses-but a history which
extends into today and the hereafter. In this area, entire bodies of law
can be seen gradually to disappear or decline in significance as the forms
of wealth change from land to promissory expectations. Here also, we see
the intrusion of new law as public concern is generated by population
jamming, traffic, pollution, and the like.
D. Reading cases for and with understanding can be handled in many
different kinds of introductory courses. However, my suggestion is that
this general objective can very nicely be included in a course designed to
teach students something about the ways in which disputes can be dealt
with. I hesitate to call the course Civil Procedure because it would
include not only adjudication, but also arbitration, mediation, negotiation
and other means of dealing with citizens' grievances against other citizens
or public officials.
E. The teaching of legal research is one of those areas that we all talk
about-and do least about. Few men really like to teach it. Those who do
it well-such as Harry Kalven at Chicago-readily move on to more
"worthwhile" things-such as teaching Torts.
This is an area where programmed instruction may have a great
role to play. However, apart from method, I think improved research

1967]

LEGAL EDUCATION

projects are our most promising secret weapon. The students should be
working on problems of real significance. As to the kinds of problems
which have such bite, I refer you to the report of the 1966 AALS Committee on Research (1966 AALS Proceedings, Part I, p. 176):
1. Research, whatever its methodology and particular focus,
should be aimed at exploring the problems that the community has in guiding its growth and in regularizing its
relationships, and not simply the problems that lawyers
encounter in participating in that process. Research in this
frame of reference implies a disposition to take account of
all potentially shaping forces in the development and regularizing process-social, economic, political, psychological and
historical.
2. Specific research projects should be conceived, insofar as
practicable, within the framework of major topical schemes
-criminal law enforcement, land use control, water resource
development, etc. This implies that general strategies should
be developed within which specific studies assume relevance
and are accordingly generated. The specific studies would
thus be endowed with a general relevance while at the same
time concentrated at the point of inquiry in the intricacies
of fact and policy that good legal research requires.
Perhaps the most promising avenue for reform here is to establish
a policy of assigning the teaching of legal research to the highest paid
member of the faculty.
To Recap:
Let's no longer talk about curricular or course reform-as distinct
from changes in methods and materials. Let's talk of change in our
educational programs.
Let's put our faith primarily in men rather than in subject matter
divisions.
Let's give a good hard look at our first year-as well as our advanced
years.
And let's take that look in terms of some very general kinds of skills
and knowledge we would like our students to acquire.
The result, I predict, will be a year much broader in concept, more
practical in effect, more catalyzing for the advanced years, and more
productive of useful research and the kinds of men we want to claim as
our alumni.

